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Abstract 
The surgical robot experienced rapid uptake throughout hospitals in the US despite lack of 
clinical evidence that it is superior to existing methods and undeterred by its high cost. This type 
of technology may be a “weapon” in the medical arms race hypothesis which asserts that 
competition among hospitals may be welfare reducing wherein it encourages resource use that is 
not commensurate with beneficial health outcomes. This paper is a case-study of the diffusion of 
the surgical robot among hospitals in Florida. We address the medical arms race hypothesis 
directly by investigating whether a hospital’s decision to adopt a robot is a function of the 
neighboring, competing hospitals’ decisions to do so. Using a spatial autoregressive probit 
model, we find that the spatial coefficient is significant and negative. That is, when neighboring 
hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. Indeed, hospitals appear to 
consider the behavior of rival hospitals, but not in a way that would be consistent with a medical 
arms race. Support is lent to the hypothesis that as more hospitals become providers of robotic-
assisted surgery (RAS), the less profitable it becomes to enter the market. 
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1. Introduction 
A primary driving force behind the extensive growth in healthcare spending in the US, the largest 
per-capita healthcare spender, is attributed to the use of medical technology in hospital services 
(Newhouse, 1992; Smith, Newhouse, & Freeland, 2009; Chandra, Holmes, & Skinner, 2013). 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the nature of competition on the adoption of medical 
technology by hospitals. More specifically, this is a case-study of the adoption of the surgical 
robot among hospitals in Florida. Since its FDA approval in 2000, the surgical robot has 
experienced rapid uptake across hospitals. The propensity toward the adoption of the surgical 
robot despite lack of clinical evidence that it is superior to existing methods together with its 
high cost has implicated the technology as a “weapon” in a medical arms race. The medical arms 
race hypothesis asserts that technology-based competition among hospitals may lead to excessive 
provision of medical technology or amenities.1  
It has been suggested that there are two distinct forms of the medical arms race. Barros et al. 
(1999) propose it could be one of lack of coordination across providers. Under certain conditions 
relating to how strongly demand responds to technology and the costs associated with adoption, 
this may result in an overinvestment in medical technology. Another possible form of a medical 
arms race concerns signaling. Hospitals might invest in the latest technology to signal their 
quality to both potential patients and medical personnel (Barros & Martinez-Giraltb, 2013). This 
                                                          
1 “Excessive” meaning sub-optimal or welfare reducing: the resource use is not commensurate with 
beneficial health outcomes, that is, at the “flat of the curve” in medicine; this would apply when a 
technology is overutilized or when less cost-effective technology is adopted). 
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real or perceived quality signal is useful to attract market volume (and physicians), as it is likely 
an important factor for patients (and physicians) when choosing among hospitals. If this largely 
explains the medical technology adoption phenomena, we expect that in most cases competition 
will increase robot adoption.  
However, other phenomenon may occur in strategic interaction in which either no hospitals 
choose to adopt or some hospitals adopt the technology while others choose not to. The former 
case may arise if adoption costs are prohibitively high. In the latter case, for example, depending 
on the relative costs of adoption, those facing higher costs may choose not to adopt while for 
those facing lower costs, the technology may be adopted.2 Alternatively, it has been noted that 
competition may have a limiting effect on technology adoption (Reinganum, 1981). Depending 
on how sensitive are patients to the presence of technology, as more hospitals adopt a technology 
the remaining market share diminishes. This results in smaller profit-margins from adopting the 
technology as time goes on. Thus, as hospitals learn of neighboring hospitals’ decision to adopt 
the technology, i.e. the “first movers”, this reduces the incentive for the neighboring hospitals to 
invest. 
Whether support is lent to the medical arms race hypothesis or whether another phenomenon 
occurs is of empirical interest since understanding the behavior of hospitals interacting 
strategically informs healthcare policymakers and stakeholders. It is also in the interest of public 
health since technology can be beneficial but also comes with costs. Using a spatial 
autoregressive probit model, we address the effect of competition directly by investigating the 
nature of a hospital’s decision to adopt a robot as a function of the neighboring, competing 
                                                          
2 Costs may be related to unobservable characteristics of the hospital and/or physician quality which we 
cannot control for in this analysis.  
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hospitals’ decision. A significant and positive spatial coefficient supports a medical arms race 
whereas a significant and negative spatial coefficient lends support to the market’s limiting 
effect. An insignificant result indicates there is no underlying spatial relationship in the diffusion 
of the robot. This may suggest the technology diffusion is not driven by the behavior of rival 
hospitals or that it may be driven by some quality-cost differences unobservable to the 
researchers. We find that the spatial coefficient is significant and negative. That is, when 
neighboring hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. Indeed, 
hospitals appear to consider the behavior of rival hospitals, but not in a way that would be 
consistent with a medical arms race. Support is lent to the hypothesis that as more hospitals 
become providers of robotic-assisted surgery (RAS), the less profitable it becomes to enter the 
market. 
The dissertation is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide motivation and relevant 
background information related to the US healthcare market, the surgical robot, diffusion of 
technology in the hospital market and a review of the literature; in 3 we suggest a conceptual 
framework which motivates the empirical model; in section 4 we cover the econometric model, 
estimation strategy and data; in 5 we discuss results and robustness checks; and in section 6 we 
conclude.  
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2. Background 
2.1. US healthcare system 
Several distinguishing and interrelated aspects of US healthcare system facilitate or determine 
technology adoption: the presence of health insurance, uncertainty about efficacy of care and 
market structure. 
2.1.1. Health insurance 
One of the features of the US healthcare market is the presence of insurance and its 
reimbursement mechanisms. Since patients with health insurance are generally only expected to 
pay some portion of the total cost of medical care, out-of-pocket expenses are relatively low 
which may lead to price insensitivity when deciding how much healthcare to consume. 
Depending on the reimbursement mechanism, healthcare providers may also be insensitive to 
costs. This was particularly concerning when payments were made retrospectively, i.e. ex post, 
based on services rendered. Neither patients or hospitals had cost considerations that might limit 
the adoption or use of medical technology (or consumption of healthcare, more generally). In 
fact, even from an innovation perspective, it has been shown that insurance may increase the 
entry of (cost-increasing) medical technologies (Goddeeris 1984).  
This overinvestment was potentially curbed in the early 1980s with some structural 
changes to the healthcare market. With the introduction of Medicare’s Prospective Payment 
System (PPS), payments were no longer tied to actual costs but rather to a pre-determined 
amount according to the classification of the visit, i.e. diagnosis-related group (DRG). Since a 
hospital can retain the difference between the DRG payment and actual costs, this structure 
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provides the incentive for hospitals to become more cost-conscious in their care decisions. 
Around the same time, managed care in US private healthcare insurance took roots with its 
various strategies aimed to cull costs. For example, in network-based managed care 
organizations, hospitals compete for selective contracting with insurance companies to have 
access to their network of patients. This competition puts downward pressure on hospitals’ costs. 
In the mid-1990s, prompted by patients’ complaints about lack of options and with the growth of 
consolidated hospital systems, health insurance companies lost some of their power against 
hospitals. These conditions, which describe the current healthcare environment, make it 
relatively more favorable for overinvestment in medical technology. 
2.1.2. Efficacy of care 
Many medical technologies have significantly enhanced the quality of our healthcare, improving 
diagnostics, minimizing invasiveness, abbreviating hospital duration, and in some cases, 
reducing costs.  However, not all technologies perform the same, and in efforts to contain the 
rising cost of health care in the US, much attention has been drawn to identify high-cost, low-
value technologies. Skinner et al. recognize a heterogeneity across medical technologies in terms 
of their productivity and find that, on a macroeconomic level, countries more likely to adopt low 
productivity technologies, particularly what they refer to as “category II & III” technologies, are 
also more likely to experience the most rapid growth in health care costs. Category II includes 
those medical technologies having less consistent health outcomes, being beneficial to some 
while not providing value to others, but are prone to overuse and thus caution should be applied 
(e.g. MRI and CT scans); category III are the medical technologies which are associated with 
incremental health benefits and may be very expensive, offering little to no value (2011). The 
relative scarceness of randomized clinical trials (RCT) compared to population-based, 
retrospective studies in the medical literature (due to the cost and ethical considerations 
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necessary for RCT) makes it difficult to distinguish the efficacy of medical technologies. Thus, 
especially in the presence of health insurance, excessive adoption can occur.  
Despite sometimes limited or conflicting information about efficacy of particular medical 
technologies, there are societal beliefs about the curative nature of medical technology. 
Marketing research finds that patient-consumers associate new and expensive technology with 
effectiveness (Korobkin, 2013); that limited use of such technology is perceived as a cost-saving 
decision, even when there is lack of evidence of the technology clinically surpassing traditional 
methods (Schleifer & Rothman, 2012); and that advertising is directed at patients (Brennan, 
2006). Indeed, the makers of the surgical robot have taken a direct-to-consumer advertising 
approach, sometimes leading patients to demand RAS. Moreover, marketing for robotic 
procedures typically relies on the same positive aspects of traditional MIS, making it misleading. 
2.1.3. Hospital market 
While the above-mentioned market characteristics facilitate investment in medical technology, 
the focus of this dissertation is on the role of the market in particular. The hospital market 
structure in the US tends toward an oligopoly with strategic interaction occurring among 
hospitals as they aim to maximize profits. We expect that even non-profit hospitals behave 
similarly, which is standard in the literature. This was put forth by Newhouse (1970) in his 
theory of output maximization and empirically corroborated by Horwitz and Nichol (2007). They 
found that in the presence of for-profit hospitals, non-profit hospitals will aim to maximize 
profits, since the for-profit hospitals “cream skim” patients, leaving the non-profit hospitals with 
a patient mix that tends to lose money for the hospital. Survival requires a non-profit to act in 
profit-maximizing ways.  
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Strategic interaction is a defining characteristic of the oligopolistic market structure that 
the US hospital market most closely parallels. The existence of health insurance and the resulting 
insensitivity of most patients to price leads to the presence of non-price competition among 
hospitals as they compete to obtain greater market share. Higher market share leads to higher 
utilization rates, economies of scale and improved learning curves. 
2.1.3.1. Medical arms race 
Under certain conditions, the strategic interaction between hospitals may lead them to overinvest 
in medical technology. As presented by Barros et al. (1999), the medical arms race can be 
summarized in the following game. Suppose the cost of adoption of a particular technology 
differs across hospitals where the cost for hospital B exceeds the cost for hospital A, i.e. 𝐶 > 𝑐. 
Further assume that there are N patients paying price p for the hospital visit. Patients are taken to 
be highly responsive to the presence of technology such that if the technology is present in both 
hospitals, the patients will be split evenly across the two hospitals whereas if one hospital has the 
technology and the other is a non-adopter, all patients will go to the hospital with technology. 
The hospitals’ payoff matrix will be the following: 
Table 1. Hospital payoff matrix 
 Hospital B 
 
Hospital A 
 Adopt technology No technology 
Adopt technology Np/2-c, Np/2-C Np-c, 0 
No technology 0, Np-C Np/2, Np/2 
 
A variety of outcomes may arise depending on the relationship between costs and expected 
patient-volume revenue. Assuming adoption costs are low so that c < C < Np/2, a prisoner’s 
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dilemma emerges. The optimal outcome is for neither hospital to adopt the technology, but due 
to lack of coordination between hospitals, both providers will invest in the technology, i.e. a 
medical arms race. The results rely on the underlying assumptions about the sensitivity of 
patients to the presence of technology: the first-mover obtains the market share. As mentioned 
above, patients do appear to be highly sensitive to medical technology. In a related continuous-
time game framework put forth by Fudenberg & Tirole (1985), it has been shown that in a 
duopoly, rents are equilized in the presence of threats of preemption; however, in a broader 
oligopoly, the advantage of preemption is sufficiently small so that late adoption can occur in a 
symmetric equilibrium . The MAR has also been presented purely as a signaling theory (Barros 
et al., 1999). If the hospitals are using the technology to signal their underlying and unobserved 
quality, under certain conditions related to their true quality and costs of adoption, the perfect 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium may be that overinvestment occurs. 
2.1.3.2. Other outcomes 
However, other outcomes may arise. Maintaining the assumption of highly sensitive demand in 
the simultaneous game representation (i.e. coordination), if costs of adopting are sufficiently 
high, C > c > Np/2, the dominant strategy is for both hospitals not to adopt. On the other hand, if 
adoption costs are distinct across hospitals so that C > Np/2 > c, the interaction would result in 
the hospital facing higher costs, B, choosing not to adopt the technology while for the hospital A 
with lower costs, the technology will be adopted. A similar equilibrium may arise from signaling 
under certain conditions related to costs of adoption that distinguish high and low-quality 
doctors/hospitals. For example, high-quality doctors may have a shorter learning curve. In these 
cases, the market may function to counteract excessive adoption of medical technology. From a 
more dynamic perspective, there are several theoretical models that explain a process of 
technology diffusion in which an agent’s own payoffs and the payoffs of other agents in the 
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network are known. As true payoffs are revealed, an efficient equilibrium will emerge (Bala & 
Goyal, 1998). Along the same line, Reinganum’s (1981) model suggests that, at first, 
competition increases the diffusion of a technology as first-movers attempt to gain competitive 
advantage. However, the market share will decrease as more firms adopt the technology, thereby 
reducing the incentive to adopt the technology. Each of these results in a strategic interaction in 
which some hospitals adopt the technology (i.e., the true “high quality” or the “first-movers”), 
while others choose not to. 
2.2. Surgical robot 
Minimally invasive surgery (MIS), also referred to as laparoscopic surgery, can be performed 
through “keyhole” incisions and is associated with significant improvements over the 
comparable surgery performed traditionally, that is, open surgery.  Advantages of MIS over 
traditional/open surgery include lessened complications and blood loss, reduced recovery times, 
shorter hospital duration and lessened post-operative pain and scaring rendering it a major leap 
forward in surgery.  In 2000, the FDA approved the only surgical “robot” capable of performing 
MIS, Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci Surgical System, which is now used in adult and pediatric 
MIS/laparoscopic surgeries including general, cardiac, colorectal, gynecological, head and neck, 
thoracic and urologic. A breakdown of the primary procedure codes associated with the robotic 
surgeries performed at hospitals with the surgical robot in our sample. Approximately half of the 
RAS-performed procedures were prostatectomy and hysterectomy.   
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Figure 1. Primary procedures for which RAS was performed, all hospitals 
 
The machine, which requires a dedicated operating room and costs approximately $2 million, 
allows a specially-trained surgeon to indirectly control surgical instruments attached to robotic 
arms suspended above the patient by way of a remote computer-control. The instruments are 
receptive to feedback allowing for smoother, tremor-free motions from the surgeon and greater 
range of motion. Although the overall surgery time generally exceeds that of traditional 
minimally-invasive methods, from the console the surgeons have better visualization via a 
magnified high-definition 3-D viewfinder and they can move more freely which may lead to 
better health outcomes when compared to traditional laparoscopic surgery.  
As an iteration of MIS, RAS sometimes has clear advantages over traditional, open 
surgery. However, the clinical benefits of robotic-MIS over traditional MIS have not yet been 
clearly substantiated with the current population-based studies indicating minimal or no clinical 
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advantages despite higher costs. Thus far, there has been a lack of randomized controlled trials 
assessing the traditional/open/conventional, conventional-laparoscopic/minimally invasive, and 
robotic-assisted laparoscopic approaches. The reliance on retrospective studies comparing these 
methods makes generalization difficult due to the inability to control for potentially important 
confounding factors such as surgeon training and ability.   
There have been notable meta-analyses comparing these approaches in radical 
prostatectomy and gynecological/hysterectomy procedures with mixed conclusions. The 
population-based meta-analysis comparing traditional, conventional-laparoscopic and robotic-
laparoscopic approaches to radical prostatectomy concludes that robotic prostatectomy 
performed at least as well as traditional or traditional-laparoscopic approaches based on primary 
outcomes (reduced blood loss, lower morbidity, positive surgical margins and safety) and 
secondary outcomes (transfusion rates, hospital length of stay and individual complication rates). 
The authors acknowledge that the large size of the study may lead to statistical significance 
without clinical significance. Further, no assessment of the costs was considered (Tewari et al., 
2012). 
Another large, population-based study compares RAS use in hysterectomy relative to 
conventional laparoscopic hysterectomy. The study, which makes use of propensity score 
matching, suggests robotic-MIS and traditional MIS perform similarly on measures of 
complication. Specifically, robotically-assisted hysterectomy slightly decreased the probability 
of hospital stay longer than two days but was associated with no difference in the need for 
transfusion or discharge to a nursing facility.  Despite the similar outcomes, the RAS had an 
associated cost premium of $2,189. Yet, hysterectomies performed robotically, which were 
FDA-approved starting in 2005, have increased from 0.5 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2010 
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(Wright et al. 2013). Indeed, according to a systematic review of the literature on surgical 
treatments for gynecologic indications, there is no clear evidence to conclude RAS or traditional 
MIS provides superior outcomes (Gala et al., 2014). As of March 2015, the Committee on 
Gynecological Practice, Society of Gynecologic Surgeons, had the following opinion on RAS in 
the field: 
“Adoption of new surgical techniques should be driven by what is best for the 
patient, as determined by evidence-based medicine rather than external pressures. Well-
designed randomized controlled trials or comparably rigorous nonrandomized 
prospective trials are needed to determine which patients are likely to benefit from robot-
assisted surgery and to establish the potential risks.” 
While one such randomized controlled trial exists in the field of urology, it compares the clinical 
benefits of the RAS procedure to the procedure performed traditionally rather than conventional 
laparoscopically. The first stage of a randomized controlled trial comparing robotically-assisted 
prostatectomies (the most common use of the surgical robot) with traditional/open surgery 
localized prostate cancer treatment found similar outcomes at 12 weeks in terms of urinary and 
sexual function, post-operative complications and days missed from work. As would be 
expected, the prostatectomies performed via the robotic MIS were associated with less blood loss 
and less post-operative pain compared to the open surgery, but at 12 weeks, these differences 
leveled out. A second phase with long-term results is forthcoming (Yaxley et al., 2016). 
Robotic-assisted MIS presents its own disadvantages including longer surgery times and 
mid and post-operative complications, some linked to deaths. In addition to the high fixed costs 
associated with the adoption of the surgical robot, high variable costs include an annual 
maintenance service contract with Intuitive costing $100,000-$170,000 and per-use disposables 
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which increase the per-procedure cost $1,200-$2,000 relative to an equivalent MIS procedure. If 
hospital duration is reduced by RAS, then some of the variable cost can be offset. 
Despite the large costs associated with this technology, hospitals are reimbursed the same 
regardless of the MIS method used, and thus the extensive costs mentioned provide an incentive 
for a recuperation of costs on the part of the hospital.3 One way in which these higher costs are 
passed on in this reimbursement structure is by increasing the charges for the procedures or 
diagnoses for which surgical robots can be utilized either to account for the inability of some 
patients to fulfil their payments, particularly the uninsured, and/or to account for the replacement 
and updating of technology. Because Medicare and private-insurer reimbursement rates are 
determined by these procedure and diagnosis charges, the added costs related to the surgical 
robot are indirect (Barbash & Glied, 2010). High marginal costs may be offset through 
economies of scale as higher volume allows surgeons to become more proficient. It has been 
estimated that in order to offset the fixed and variable expense associated with the acquisition of 
the surgical robot through economies of scale, hospitals must perform 150-300 procedures each 
year for six years (Lee, 2014). Thus, the incentive exists to perform surgery with the technology 
rather than without, even if it is not clinically optimal for the patient, an occurrence known as 
“treatment creep”. Eventually hospitals are assumed to earn profit from RAS, so increasing 
patient volume and/or performing a surgery that otherwise would not have occurred can return 
profits sooner. 
                                                          
3 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) designates certain rural hospitals as “Critical 
Access Hospitals” (CMAs) and, as a function of Medicare beneficiaries at the hospital, these hospitals are 
eligible for varying subsidized capital expenditures including the da Vinci Surgical System. At the time of 
the analysis, 13 hospitals in Florida have been given this designation: Calhoun – Liberty Hospital, 
Campbellton-Graceville, Doctor’s Memorial – Bonifay, Fishermen’s, Florida Hospital Wauchula, George 
E. Weems, Hendry RMC, Lake Butler, Madison County Memorial and Mariners. 
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Figure 1 summarizes, for all relevant hospitals in Florida, the historical ratio of hospitals 
with the surgical robot to those without from 2008 to 2013. The figure reveals that the surgical 
robot has steadily increased in number and as a percentage of all hospital ownership, with 21 
percent of hospitals having acquired a surgical robot in 2008 to over half having obtained one by 
the year 2013. In Florida, a certificate of need is not required for the purchase of the surgical 
robot. 
 
Figure 2. Adoption of the surgical robot; all long-term, acute care hospitals in Florida 
 
From a geographical perspective, the spatial distribution of the hospitals in Florida that 
have acquired the surgical robot in 2008 and 2013 are displayed for comparison in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. We seek to determine whether there is a spatial element to the presence of the surgical 
robot in hospitals across Florida. See Appendix B for further exploratory spatial analysis. 
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Figure 3. Spatial distribution of surgical robots in 2008 
 
Figure 4. Spatial distribution of surgical robots in 2013 
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2.3. Literature review 
Due to the impact of insurance on the behavior of healthcare providers, the literature can be 
segmented into “pre-managed care” and “post-managed care” sets and a more recent set of 
literature which encompasses the increase in hospital negotiating power as they consolidate into 
systems. The general consensus in the pre-managed care literature is that competition in the 
healthcare market leads to increased costs.  That is, hospitals in less concentrated markets have 
higher costs per patient (Robinson & Luft, 1985; Noether, 1988), a higher employee/patient ratio 
(Robinson, 1988), and more high-tech services (Luft et al., 1986). Generally, the conclusion 
reverses, however, after the growth of managed care. Melnick & Zwanziger confirm the negative 
relationship between costs and concentration prior to the growth of managed care organizations 
and identify a loss of correlation post-PPO (1988). In another study, Zwanziger & Melnick find 
that after selective contracting, the rate of cost growth is smaller in less concentrated markets 
(1988). Taking advantage of the rollout of Medicare PPO in California, Dranove, Shanley, & 
Simon discover no relationship prior to managed care, but that post-managed care, more 
competition lead to a reduction in cost/price-margins (1992). Kessler & McClellan (1999) use a 
three-stage model in which a predicted measure of a hospital’s patients are chosen based on a 
patient-level hospital choice model determined by such factors as demographics and distance 
from the patient’s residence. Hospital market competitiveness is based on these predicted patient 
flows rather than the actual patient flows which breaks the endogeneity inherent in hospital 
selection and measures of HHI. Using this approach, they find that in the presence of managed 
care, competition reduced costs and adverse health outcomes.  
Narrowing down the literature to technology adoption, in particular, many studies 
confirm a medical arms race hypothesis. James models the relative-size-weighted (that is, the 
number of hospital beds as a fraction of total hospital beds in the county) number of hospitals in 
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a county that offer specific high-tech services as a function of the hospital demand and cost shift 
factors and a measure of competition.  Her measure of weighting, she argues, emphasizes the 
ability of patients to have access to the treatment, and this distinction corresponds to the 
overprovision of a service causing an “unnecessary degree of access rather than a greater number 
of providers” (2002). Ladapo et al. study computed tomography, a type of imaging technology 
(2009).  While controlling for clinical need and other hospital characteristics such as the 
operating margins, insurance reimbursement rates, whether related services were offered, and in 
particular a proxy for being a “first mover” / “technological leader” (i.e. adoption of PET), this 
article determines that early adoption is influenced by cardiac patient volume and hospital 
operating margins, but not by market competitiveness or insurance reimbursement.  To assess the 
level of competitiveness in each hospital’s market, a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is 
constructed by summing the square of the hospital’s admissions relative to the Hospital Referral 
Region/markets’ admissions. Sethi (2014) finds that the adoption of endovascular aneurism 
repair adoption is associated with market forces – patients at more competitive hospitals are at 
increased odds of undergoing EVAR.  He makes use of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample from 
the American Hospital Association annual survey, linked with Hospital Market Structure data for 
estimating HHI in a variable geographic radius defined by its encompass of 90 percent of 
discharged patients. 
Studies with particular application to the adoption of surgical robots are more limited.  
Most recently, a patient-level study on the influence of market forces and hospital financial 
status (as measured by the operating margin) on the usage of surgical robots for certain 
procedures finds evidence that increased market competition (as measured by HHI) is correlated 
with increased usage.  However, conditioned on having acquired a surgical robot, only one 
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procedure type (partial nephrectomy) was (positively) associated with the hospital’s operating 
margins.  Wright et al. finds a positive correlation between more competitive regional markets 
(HHI-based) and an increased probability of patients receiving a RAS; however, they find also 
that once a hospital obtains the surgical robot, it is no more or less likely to provide RAS as a 
function of the competition (2016). Barbash, et al. (2014) study the determinants of robot 
adoption and conclude that factors associated with the adoption of a surgical robot include: 
increased proportion of other hospitals within the set geographic market area having already 
acquired a robot, hospitals with more than 300 beds, and teaching hospitals. 
In Li et al. (2014), the researchers model a hospital’s decision to acquire a surgical robot 
as a function of the nearest neighbor’s previous decision to do so, teaching status, surgical 
volume, number of beds and urban setting. Using inpatient data from seven states between the 
years of 2001 and 2005, along with data from the robot manufacturer, Li et al. (2014) model this 
as a temporal and spatial decision using a two-state Markov chain method.  They find evidence 
in support of the medical arms race which is to say that if the nearest neighboring hospital 
previously acquired a robot, a hospital was more likely to acquire one as well (OR 1.71, p=0.02). 
While the current study is similar in Li et al.’s direct approach in answering the medical arms 
race, their analysis is limited by assuming influence exists only from the nearest neighbors. The 
current study makes no such restriction and allows for a more comprehensive influence from 
nearby hospitals (subject to the assumptions made by the spatial weights matrix selection) as 
described in the empirical section. Additionally, as explained below, it may not be necessary to 
model the decision temporally since, under weak assumptions the simultaneous equilibrium 
outcome is encompassing. 
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3. Conceptual framework 
We borrow the theoretical and empirical framework suggested by Mobley (2003) and used by 
Mobley, Frech, & Anselin (2009) and Gravelle, Santos, & Siciliani (2014) to ask whether 
provision of robotic surgery is a strategic complement, i.e. whether each hospital responds to 
rival hospitals' provision of robotic surgery with its own provision of that service. The hospital 
market is characterized as an oligopoly in which the equilibrium provision of robotic surgery is 
determined in simultaneous profit-maximizing decisions where each hospital’s reaction function 
depends on the expected decision of nearby hospitals.   
Empirically, this question can be answered using a spatial model in which the effect of 
neighboring hospitals' decisions to operate using robots depends on spatial proximity, i.e. the 
spatial autoregressive model.  The spatial lag parameter (described later) is interpreted as the 
slope of the reaction function.  Mobley (2003) and Mobley et al. (2009) apply this theoretical 
motivation for the corresponding empirical model to examine the effect of competition on price 
while Gravelle, Santos, & Siciliani (2014) do so for the effect of competition on quality. 
The adapted theoretical model is as follows.  The demand function of hospital i can be 
defined as 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋(𝑦𝑖, 𝒚−𝒊; 𝛿𝑖), where 𝑦𝑖 is the operation of robotic machines of hospital i, 𝒚−𝒊 is 
the corresponding decision of neighboring rival hospitals, and 𝛿𝑖 are hospital demand 
parameters.  We assume that hospitals receive a per-treatment price, p.  Hospital cost parameters 
are denoted 𝛾𝑖.  The objective function of hospital i is to choose 𝑦𝑖  to maximize 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑋𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦−𝑖; 𝛿𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖(𝑋𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦−𝑖), 𝑦𝑖; 𝛾𝑖) − 𝐹𝑖  
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Assuming hospitals simultaneously choose robotic surgery provision, then maximizing the 
objective function above with respect to 𝑦𝑖, we obtain the first order condition for the Nash 
equilibrium   
 𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑦𝑖
(𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝑦−𝑖
∗ ) = 0 
(1) 
Further assuming the hospital objective function is strictly concave in its choice variable i.e., 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑦𝑖
2 (𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝑦−𝑖
∗ ) < 0 
we have the Nash equilibrium: (𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝑦−𝑖
∗ ). The system of two equations with two unknowns given 
in equation (1) can be solved for 𝑦𝑖 to give the reaction function for hospital i   
𝑦𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑦𝑖
𝑅(𝑦−𝑖; 𝛿𝑖, 𝛾𝑖) 
We are interested in the effect of rivals' robotic surgery provision decisions on hospital i's robotic 
surgery provision.  By the implicit function theorem, we obtain the slope of the reaction function 
for hospital i, 
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝑅
𝜕𝑦−𝑖
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑦−𝑖
⁄
−
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝑦𝑖
2⁄
 
Where, given our second-order assumption, the sign of the cross-partial derivative determines 
whether robotic surgery provision is a strategic complement (positive), strategic substitute 
(negative), or independent. The cross-partial derivative represents the derivative of the hospital’s 
marginal profit with respect to the rivals’ choice.   
The decision to adopt a surgical robot may not in fact be simultaneous, but rather 
conditioned on nearby decisions made in previous years. As noted in LeSage and Pace (2009) 
   
26 
 
and LeSage et al. (2011), the simultaneous spatial autoregressive model can be interpreted as the 
steady state equilibrium for the dynamic process.4  In other words, cross-sectional spatial 
dependence can capture the diffusion of the surgical robot over time; therefore, we have modeled 
the decision as a simultaneous one. 
  
                                                          
4 As outlined in (Pace & LeSage, 2010; J. P. LeSage et al., 2011), we can begin by examining a dynamic 
spatial model omitting any simultaneous element and then showing that, under certain conditions, the 
model converges to the simultaneous version. Starting with spatiotemporal model that relies only on past 
data and omits any simultaneous spatial interaction, we have 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0𝑛, 𝜎
2𝐼𝑛) 
 
𝐺 = 𝜏𝐼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑊 
 
𝜏 is a scalar parameter that represents the dependence over time for a given observation at time t and t-1 
while 𝜌 is the scalar parameter capturing the dependence between observation i at time t and observation j (i ≠ j) at 
time t-1. The recursive relation after t time periods would be 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺𝑦0
𝑡 + (𝐼𝑛 + 𝐺 + 𝐺
2 +⋯+ 6𝑡−1)𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢 
 
𝑢 = 𝐺𝑡−1𝜀𝑡 +⋯+ 𝐺𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
After a large t has passed, we can find the steady-state equilibrium assuming 𝐺𝑡 ≈ 0𝑛 and zero expectation for the 
disturbance terms. That is,  
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) ≈ (𝐼𝑛 − 𝐺)
−1𝑋𝛽 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) ≈ (𝐼𝑛(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝑋𝛽 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) ≈ (𝐼𝑛
𝜌
1 − 𝜏
𝑊)
−1
𝑋
𝛽
1 − 𝜏
 
 
This is a reparameterization of the simultaneous model where 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡) = (1 − 𝜌
∗𝑊)−1𝑋𝛽∗ 
 
𝜌∗ =
𝜌
1 − 𝜏
 
 
𝛽∗ =
𝛽
1 − 𝜏
 
Note that the (1 − 𝜏)−1 is the same long-run multiplier from time-series literature. 
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4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. Empirical specification 
It has been noted that improper measures of market competitiveness which rely on ad-hoc 
definitions of the hospital market may impart bias on the estimates (Kessler & McClellan, 1999). 
For example, measures of the market extent such as government-defined boundaries, hospital 
referral regions, and fixed and variable radii methods so often used in empirical studies related to 
market structure may not contain all relevant competitors and thus can bias the effects of 
competition measures which rely on these estimations (Sherer and Ross, 1990; Pindyck and 
Rubinfield, 1998).5 The HHI, which sums the square of the shares of the market and is the most 
prevalent method of measuring market competitiveness, ignores the geographic distribution of 
hospitals within an area. Applied to hospitals, the shares may be computed as, for example, the 
number of hospital beds as a fraction of total hospital beds in the county (James, 1997) or a 
hospital’s admissions relative to the Hospital Referral Region/markets’ admissions (Ladapo, 
2009). In any case, it is likely that the volume-shares which this measure relies on are a function 
of unobserved heterogeneity related to the hospital quality (real or perceived) which is itself a 
function of the technology it offers, that is, the HHI is endogenous. These bias the estimated 
relationship between HHI as a measure of market competitiveness and hospital costs and/or 
outcomes. It is worth noting that the underlying intuition behind the general approach outlined 
here is that hospitals are strategically interacting with each other although these methods do not 
                                                          
5 The “fixed radii” method assumes that all hospital rivals exist within a given distance of a given hospital 
while the “variable radii” method assumes a hospital’s rivals are any other hospital within a radius 
specific to the hospital such as one that contains some percentage of the hospital’s patients. 
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test directly for this behavior. The spatial autoregressive framework introduced below allows us 
to mitigate much of the bias caused by these issues. 
The spatial autoregressive probit model can be written structurally,  
 𝒚∗ = 𝑿𝜷 + 𝜌𝑾𝒚∗ + 𝜀, 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2𝑰𝑵) (1) 
Where 𝒚∗, an 𝑁×1vector where N is the number of hospitals in the data set, is the underlying 
(net-profit) decision process with elements 𝑦𝑖
∗ that produces the observed binary outcome 
whether hospital i operates a robot, denoted as an element 𝑦𝑖 of the 𝑁×1 vector 𝒚. The 
relationship is established as  
𝑦𝑖 = {
1, 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0
0, 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
   
As mentioned, the slope of the reaction function corresponds to the estimate of the spatial 
lag parameter, a scalar 𝜌, which measures the strength (and direction) of the dependence and is 
supported on [-1, 1].  Here, the spatial weights matrix 𝑾 is specified as a function of distance. 
We have defined 𝑾 to be a row-normalized, inverse-distance 𝑁×𝑁 matrix with each 
element, 𝑤𝑖𝑗, expressing the degree of spatial proximity as:  
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1
𝑗
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠
0    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is defined as the distance between hospital i and j and we have bounded the matrix at 
the ten nearest neighbors. 6,7  The inverse distance gives a lower weight to the decision of rivals 
                                                          
6 See Appendix B for details about the construction of spatial weights matrices. 
 
7 The choice of ten neighbors was chosen after a model comparison using the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and experimenting with the ideal number of neighbors to include in order to optimize the 
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that are more distant from hospital i, pursuant to Tobler’s First Law of Geography which states, 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things". 
The N diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑖, take the value of zero. Thus, 𝑾𝒚
∗ is the spatial-weighted average 
decision process of neighboring hospitals.  Note that the normalization of the spatial weights 
matrix along with the nearest-neighbors bound limit the allowable dependence.  Finally, X 
captures hospital demand and cost variables (e.g. structural measures characterizing the hospital 
markets which ultimately determine the equilibrium provision of robotic technological services), 
and 𝜀 represents the unobserved factors.   
The spatial model nests the standard probit model so that if 𝜌 = 0, spatial dependence is 
not present and we can rely on non-spatial methods.  However, if 𝜌 ≠ 0, as is often the case with 
units interacting in space, ignoring the neighboring outcomes by treating the model as non-
spatial not only results in the omitted variable problem which biases the effects of the other 
variables and but also sacrifices information available to the researcher (Case, 1992). Similarly, a 
simultaneity exists due to the implied lack of independence; however, the current practice for 
applied spatial probit estimation is to ignore this shortcoming rather than to omit a crucial 
variable representing the underlying spatial interdependence. It has been shown that the bias 
caused by the omission of a statistically significant spatial interdependence is more concerning 
that the bias caused by these endogeneity concerns (Franzese & Hays, 2009).  
4.2. Interpretation of estimates 
In addition to the familiar non-linear aspect of the probit model, the potential dependence among 
observations allows a change in the ith observation’s 𝑣th explanatory variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑣, to affect not 
                                                          
underlying information. Our results are robust to these specifications. Full results for several of the 
specifications are provided in the Appendix. 
   
30 
 
only the own-𝑦𝑖 (expected probability of robot-adoption) but the other-𝑦𝑗  (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) as well, 
returning additional non-linearity. Note that this is not a direct effect of 𝑥𝑖𝑣 on 𝑦𝑗, but rather the 
effect 𝑥𝑖𝑣has on 𝑦𝑖 which (potentially) affects 𝑦𝑗.  In other words, hospital i’s decision to adopt a 
surgical robot may depend not only on its own hospital and market characteristics but also the 
neighboring hospitals’ decisions which are a function of their own hospital and market 
characteristics. For example, a hospital’s share of patients that are privately insured is expected 
to be a determinant of the hospital’s decision to offer RAS; however, it is also possible that when 
making the decision, the hospital will consider the neighboring hospitals’ decisions which are 
determined by the neighbors’ own share of private insurance payers (i.e. a “spillover”). The 
parameter estimates in spatial models contain additional information about the underlying, 
potential spatial nature of the robot adoption decision process. Although not of particular interest 
for this dissertation, these estimates can inform policy-makers and hospital administrators about 
the nature of the spatial spillovers occurring across hospitals and their markets. 
For simplification, let us begin by examining the differences between the marginal effects of 
the non-spatial linear model and the spatial autoregressive model with a continuous dependent 
variable. 
 
Non-spatial / linear  Spatial autoregressive (continuous dep. var.) 
E(∂yi ∂xiv⁄ ) = βv E(∂y ∂xv
′⁄ ) = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1(Inβv) 
Compared to the linear regression with its assumption of independence, we can see that the 
marginal effect is not simply equivalent to the parameter estimate but rather an nxn matrix with 
the following implication.  The diagonal elements of this matrix contain the own-partial 
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derivatives, 𝜕𝑦𝑖 𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑣
′⁄ . On the other hand, the off-diagonal elements consist of the cross-partial 
derivatives, 𝜕𝑦𝑖 𝜕𝑥𝑗,𝑣
′⁄  which capture the effect that changes in the neighboring explanatory 
variables can have on the hospital i through the neighboring outcomes; these effects can be 
thought of as the “spatial spillover”. Again, note that there is no direct effect of neighboring 
hospital explanatory variables implied by the spatial autoregressive model. In fact, the effect is 
through the impact that the neighboring hospitals’ explanatory variables have on these hospitals’ 
decisions to adopt the surgical robot. More specifically, we assume no correlation between 
neighboring hospitals’ characteristics and a hospital’s error (Case, 1992). A scalar summary of 
both of these effects can be obtained by averaging the values across the observations, generating 
what is referred to as the direct effect and indirect effect, respectively. The sum of these effects 
produces the total effect (LeSage et al., 2011). 
Below is a side-by-side comparison of marginal effects for a non-spatial probit regression 
and for a spatial probit regression which helps to illustrate the additional complexity introduced 
when considering the probit counterpart to the above.  
Non-spatial probit Spatial probit 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥𝑟) 𝜕𝑥𝑟⁄ = 𝜙(𝑥𝑟𝛽𝑟)𝛽𝑟 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥𝑟) 𝜕𝑥𝑟
′ = 𝜙[(𝐼𝑛 −  𝜌𝑊)
−1𝐼𝑛?̅?𝑟𝛽𝑟]⨀⁄ (𝐼𝑛
− 𝜌𝑊)−1𝐼𝑛𝛽𝑟 
Where 𝜙(∙) is the standard normal probability density function, ?̅?𝑟is the mean value of the rth 
variable at which we evaluate the expression, and ⨀ represents multiplication element-by-
element. In the case of the non-spatial probit, the marginal effect consists of a scalar parameter 
estimate and the scaling expression by which it is multiplied.  Analogously, the spatial probit 
marginal effect consists of a matrix term multiplied element-by-element to a matrix scaling term. 
It is from this expression that the diagonal elements are averaged to produce the direct effect and 
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the off-diagonal elements are averaged to produce the indirect effect of the spatial probit 
estimation (LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
4.3. Estimation technique 
Even if we were estimating a continuous dependent variable, the presence of autocorrelation 
precludes estimation using OLS methods which requires independence of observations. 
Moreover, for modeling the discrete outcome, the implied lack of independence across 
observations is reflected in the likelihood being of n dimensions (cumulative normal) rather than 
n one-dimensional likelihoods, the integration of which (necessary to obtain individual parameter 
distributions) poses a challenge known as the “multidimensional integration issue”. Several 
estimation techniques have been created to deal with this concern, but it is becoming most 
common to estimate spatial probit using either frequentist recursive-importance sampling (RIS) 
or, most often, Bayesian methods. See Billé and Arbia (2013) and Franzese & Hays (2009) for a 
comprehensive review of spatial discrete choice estimation techniques. Bayesian methodology is 
also preferred for small sample inferences.  
The Bayesian approach to the spatial probit is based on augmenting the data to include 
the latent vector, y*, which describes the underlying continuous distribution and determines with 
certainty the discrete outcome, y.  As LeSage and Pace (2009) note, Albert and Chib's (1993) 
treatment of Bayesian probit can be extended to the spatial model so that 𝑝(𝛽, 𝜌|𝑦∗,𝑊) =
𝑝(𝛽, 𝜌|𝑦∗, 𝑦,𝑊).  Thus, if we treat 𝐲∗ as an additional vector of parameters, the conditional 
distribution will have the same form as in the Bayesian spatial autoregressive model with a 
continuous dependent variable.8  
                                                          
8 See Appendix for the derivation of the full-conditional distributions for this model. 
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We will state the likelihood in terms of the latent 𝐲∗. 𝐿(𝒚∗,𝑾|𝜌, 𝜷) =
(2𝜋)−1𝜎−2(𝑛 2)⁄ |𝑰𝑛 − 𝜌𝑾|𝑒
− 1
2𝜎2
(𝜺′𝜺)
 where 𝜺 = (𝑰𝑛 − 𝜌𝑾)𝑦
∗ − 𝑿𝜷 and select the following 
independent diffuse prior distributions for parameters: 𝜷 ~ 𝑁(𝑐, 𝑇), where c = 0 and T is very 
large and ρ ∼ Beta(a1, a2), where a1 = a2 = 1.9 To derive the parameter distributions, we wish to 
integrate over the joint posterior distribution (likelihood, priors) with respect to each of the 
parameters. Simulation methods provide a way in which we can numerically approximate the 
multi-dimensional integral. In Monte Carlo simulation methods, we cycle through random draws 
from the joint distribution collecting sample statistics. After sufficient samples are collected, 
population parameters can be approximated. Given the high dimensionality of the spatial probit 
likelihood, the joint posterior distribution is such that direct sampling from it is prohibitively 
complex. However, we can rely on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods which takes samples by 
“walking” around the distribution. From this distribution approximation, we can draw inferences 
on the parameter distributions. Of this family, the Gibbs sampling methods is most used. Rather 
than using independent draws from the joint distribution, Gibbs sampling relies on a sequence of 
draws from the set of parameter conditional distributions to approximate the distribution. We 
first derive individual conditional posterior distributions for each parameter: 𝑝(𝛽|𝜌, 𝑦∗, 𝑦), 
𝑝(𝜌|𝛽, 𝑦∗, 𝑦), and 𝑝(𝑦∗|𝛽, 𝜌, 𝑦) by selecting the parts of the joint distribution related to the 
particular parameter. After selecting arbitrary beginning values for the parameters 𝛽0, 𝜌0, 𝑦0
∗, we 
can then draw from the first parameter distribution conditional on the starting values of the other 
distributions, e.g. 𝑝(𝛽1|𝜌0, 𝑦0
∗, 𝑦). The second parameter’s new value is then drawn conditional 
on the new value of parameter one and the starting values of the remaining parameters, e.g. 
𝑝(𝜌1|𝛽1, 𝑦0
∗, 𝑦). Sampling through the conditional densities, sequentially, through some high 
                                                          
9 Parameter ρ has limited support from [-1, 1]. 
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number of iterations (we use 10,000 with a burn-in of 1,000 iterations), a convergent state is 
realized wherein all further draws would be from the targeted posterior joint distribution. In the 
application of MCMC to the Bayesian spatial probit, the conditional distributions for the 
parameters take the same form as in the Bayesian spatial autoregressive model with a continuous 
dependent variable: 
𝑝(𝛽|𝜌, 𝑦∗) ∝ 𝑁(𝑐∗, 𝑇∗) 
𝑐∗ = (𝑋′𝑋 + 𝑇−1)−1(𝑋′𝐴𝑦∗ + 𝑇−1𝑐) 
     𝑇∗ = (𝑋′𝑋 + 𝑇−1)−1 
A=(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) 
and 
𝑝(𝜌|𝛽, 𝑦∗) ∝ |(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)|𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.5[𝐴𝑦
∗ − 𝑋𝛽]′[𝐴𝑦∗ − 𝑋𝛽]), a non-standard distribution due to 
the determinant of (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) that requires the Metropolis-Hastings within the Gibbs sampling. 
Very generally, Metropolis-Hastings requires that we generate a candidate sample from a 
proposal distribution, and per an acceptance probability, we accept the candidate sample as part 
of the posterior sample. Finally, given the observed 𝑦 and the parameters, 𝛽 and 𝜌, we have the 
following truncated multivariate distribution for latent 𝑦∗ 
 𝑦∗~𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑁{(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝑋𝛽, [(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
′(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)]
−1}  
where as usual for identification, 𝜎𝜀
2 = 1. Sampling of 𝑦∗ from the truncated multivariate normal 
distribution requires an m-step Gibbs sampling method proposed by Geweke (1991).  
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4.4. Data and descriptive characteristics 
The dependent variable is whether hospital i offers service m in year t=2013, where m= 
{open robotic assisted procedures, laparoscopic robotic assisted procedures, percutaneous robotic 
assisted procedures, endoscopic robotic assisted procedures, thoracoscopic robotic assisted 
procedures, other and unspecified robotic assisted procedures}. These services are exclusive to 
hospitals and indicate the presence of a surgical robot.  
Aside from the particular variable of interest, that is, the simultaneous spatially-weighted 
provision of robotic surgery for hospital i’s rivals, the model controls for hospital i’s cost and 
demand factors with the following variables: principal payer – percent of patients with Medicaid, 
percent of patients with Medicare, percent of patients with private insurance; for-profit status; 
number of licensed beds; and the following case-mix controls for the hospital market: percent 
male, percent white, percent with Bachelor degree, percent over the age of 65, population density 
(population per acre), median income (logged; $,000), and whether the hospital is located rurally. 
Data Sources 
Data comes from three main sources. The geographical Hospital Facilities in Florida 
(2013) originates from the University of Florida GeoPlan Center.  It contains hospital facility 
addresses from seven different sources amounting to 341 hospitals in total. Since we compare 
only acute care hospitals, all other hospital categories have been excluded. 10  The remaining 
number of hospitals in this study totals 196. The geocoded hospitals are used in the calculation of 
the inverse-distance weighting matrix, 𝑾. 
                                                          
10 Excluded hospital categories are: acute care/long term, children specialty, psychiatric, and 
rehabilitation. 
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Using a novel approach, we have constructed hospital-specific markets by aggregating 
Census block group polygons that have their centroid within the 60-minute drive times estimated 
in ArcGIS using all accessible streets.11 From these markets, which represent the catchment 
areas, we estimate demographic market variables. In particular, we use 2010 US Census Bureau 
Block Groups for the State of Florida with fields from 2009-2013 American Community Survey 
(ACS). These data are at the block group level, where block groups are geographic entities 
consisting of census blocks that are contained within the same census tract. Block groups are the 
smallest census geography available which reduces the approximation error when apportioning 
to the markets. The ideal size of a block group is 1,500 people; however, they contain anywhere 
between 600-3000 individuals. ACS is collected annually; however, for block group it is 
provided in 5-year increments. Hospital-specific characteristics from these data include case-mix 
controls for the hospital’s market as specified above: median income, percent male, percent with 
a Bachelor’s degree, percent white, percent 65 or older, and population density. Note that this 
approach allows some overlapping of the market where hospitals draw their patients which 
underlies the competition among hospitals. 
The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) provides Florida hospital inpatient 
data including ICD-9-CM Procedure Codes.  There are six ICD-9-CM Procedure Codes for 
robotic-assisted surgeries (RAS).  Additionally, as mentioned above, the following hospital-
specific cost characteristics, 𝛾𝑖, are obtained from these data as hospital cost controls: percent of 
                                                          
11 From ESRI ArcGIS: A drive-time polygon is a region that encompasses all accessible streets that lie 
within a specified drive time from that point. Drive-time polygons can be used to evaluate the 
accessibility of a point with respect to some other features. For example, one-, two-, and three-minute 
drive-time polygons around a grocery store can be used to determine which people are most likely to shop 
at the store. 
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patients with Medicare as principle payer, percent of patients with Medicaid as principle payer, 
percent of patients with private insurance as principle payer, non-profit status of the hospital, 
number of licensed beds and whether the hospital is in a rural locale.   
Table 1 reports the descriptive characteristics of the sample hospitals and their markets. 
Hospitals with and without robotic-assisted technology generally have similar characteristics. 
Hospitals with the surgical robot are more likely to have a higher proportion of Medicaid and 
private insurance payors. These hospitals are also more likely to be non-profit. Market income is 
similar across hospitals with and without the robotic technology. Population density and the 
number of licensed beds are higher, on average, for hospitals with the technology. However, 
these hospitals are notably less likely to have Medicare payors and less likely to be in rural 
locales. The full distribution of the variables is available in Appendix A. 
  
   
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Results 
Table 2 contains the estimation results from the spatial autoregressive probit estimation, SARP, 
(column 1), and the non-spatial probit estimation (column 2), both estimated using Markov chain 
Monte Carlo sampling. As discussed, the posterior means are not useful for interpreting 
quantitatively how changes in the independent variables affect the probability that a hospital will 
adopt a surgical robot; however, the signs will be informative. Moreover, from these effects we 
can assess the spatial coefficient which is the primary focus of this study. We also report the 
direct, indirect and total marginal effects, useful for interpreting the magnitude of the effects of 
changes in explanatory variables (including the spatial spillovers) on the dependent variable. 
These results are in Table 3.   
5.1.1. Testing the MAR 
First, we note that the spatial coefficient is significant, large, and negative which suggests that 
when neighboring hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. In 
figure 3 are the distribution of draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings-within-Gibbs 
sampling required for the spatial parameter, 𝜌. An overwhelming majority of the draws exist in 
the negative space indicating a strong, negative spatial spillover effect from neighboring 
hospitals.  
Rather than a spatial clustering of hospitals with the surgical robot, the negative spatial 
parameter indicates more of a checker board pattern in space where neighboring hospitals are 
less likely to adopt a surgical robot for a given hospital with the technology. Indeed, hospitals 
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appear to consider the behavior of neighboring hospitals, but not in a way that would be 
consistent with a medical arms race. Instead, these results suggest an equilibrium of surgical 
robot acquisition at which point in time (i.e., at least by 2013) hospitals have determined that it is 
not a profit-maximizing decision to invest in this technology.  This acts to counter 
overinvestment in the medical technology.  
 
Figure 5. Posterior distribution of the spatial parameter, rho 
 
Of the hospital characteristics, the proportion of private insurance payers is positively 
associated with the hospital’s provision of RAS. The number of licensed beds is also positively 
associated with the probability of surgical robot adoption. Since the number of licensed beds is a 
proxy for hospital size, we expect that hospitals of larger size have wider scope. As for the 
market characteristics, rural hospitals are negatively associated with the decision to offer RAS.  
The non-spatial probit model, also estimated using MCMC, indicates strong statistical 
significance for all independent variables. The estimated effects of Medicare and Medicaid are 
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notably higher in the non-spatial probit model. Many of the market characteristics are inversely 
related to the dependent variable which is counter-intuitive. Given the significance of the spatial 
parameter in column 1, the omitted variable problem may suggest biased and inconsistent 
estimates in the non-spatial estimation. 
5.1.2. Marginal effects 
Next, we report the marginal impacts from which we can assess the magnitude of these effects 
and uncover underlying spatial spillovers from neighboring hospital characteristics through their 
impact on the hospitals’ RAS decisions. Table 3 summarizes these results. 
Private insurance has a strong total impact on the probability, increasing it by 66 percent for 
a one percent increase in private-payer share. This is after accounting for the 38 percent 
reduction when neighboring hospitals’ private-payer share increases by one percent. Since the 
direct effect is positive and the spatial parameter is negative, we would expect that as 
neighboring hospitals’ share of private insurance payers increases (and this increases the 
likelihood that the neighbors adopt the robot), hospital i would be less likely to invest in this 
technology. 
A hospital located in a rural setting is 23 percent less likely to offer RAS compared to a 
hospital in a non-rural region. This is derived from a 37.2 percent reduction from the direct effect 
and a 13.8 percent increase from the indirect effect. This suggests that a hospital is less likely to 
have a surgical robot if the hospital is rural, but hospitals with rural neighboring hospitals are 
more likely to offer RAS. This would make sense since a rural hospital is less likely to have a 
surgical robot, but a hospital is more likely to have a surgical robot if the neighboring hospitals 
do not have a surgical robot.  
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5.2. Further analyses 
5.2.1. Earlier period 
Given the checker board spatial pattern observed in our sample of hospitals from 2013, we have 
suggested that we have observed an equilibrium as laid out in Reinganum (1981). That is, at first 
competition increases the diffusion of a technology as first-movers attempt to gain competitive 
advantage. As more firms adopt the technology the market share will decrease and along with it 
the incentive to adopt the technology. Given the dynamic nature of this explanation, as a 
robustness check we can perform the same analysis completed for 2013 data to an earlier period 
to identify whether in a period prior to 2013, competition is seen to enhance adoption of 
technology. A positive and significant spatial parameter from this estimation would support this 
theory. We have completed the earlier-period analysis for 2011. The results of this analysis are 
reported in table 4. 
The negative and significant rho coefficient on the spatial lag indicates that the same 
spatial pattern occurs in 2011 as in 2013. A hospital is less likely to offer RAS if neighboring 
hospitals have done so. The rates of uptake outlaid in figure 1 indicate that an even earlier time-
period may be more useful in establishing robustness to the theory. Perhaps in 2008 or 2009 
competition was having a positive effect on the technology adoption. Unfortunately, 2011 is the 
earliest year for which we can obtain the necessary data for our geographical boundaries used in 
the construction of the hospital markets. 
5.2.2. Hospital capacity 
Hospitals with a surgical robot tend to be larger in terms of the number of licensed beds. It is 
possible that the reported results reflect the interaction between nearby hospitals that do not 
necessarily compete with each other due to difference in capacity. For example, a small hospital 
may not consider a neighboring large hospital to be a competitor for high-tech services and may 
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indeed be less likely to offer those services once the larger hospital has established this service 
and the stated results may simply capture this effect. Although we control for the number of 
licensed beds, given that the Bayesian estimation allows for inferences on small samples, we 
consider a specification excluding hospitals with fewer than 75 licensed beds to test for these 
non-linear effects across hospital capacity. The results, found in column 2 of Table 5, 
corroborate what we have found using the full sample of hospitals indicating that even among 
just the larger hospitals, there is a reduced probability of offering RAS if a neighboring large 
hospital has the service. The -0.651 rho parameter for the 𝑾𝒚∗ remains negative and significant. 
5.2.3. Hospital networks 
It may be important to distinguish hospitals that are part of a system from those who are stand-
alone hospitals because networked or system hospitals may choose to provide certain services at 
one or a select number of locations since they can coordinate care across the different locations, 
that is, a within-network strategic interaction. Although not all networked hospitals may organize 
this way and other important factors may be involved, this provides a straight-forward way to 
distinguish a non-adoption decision due to strategic interaction across hospitals (or hospital-
networks) from a non-adoption decision due to within-network strategy. Since some hospitals in 
our sample are in fact a part of a larger hospital network or system in which the delivery of 
services may be a coordinated effort, we have estimated a model including a dummy variable 
indicating those as such. The results from this specification appear in column 3 in Table 5. The 
consideration of the network has little effect on the spatial lag which is still strongly negative and 
significant.  
5.2.4. Intensive margin 
It may also be of interest to investigate whether, among hospitals that do have a surgical robot, 
there is a tendency for RAS to be performed more frequently when neighboring hospitals with 
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the technology are performing high levels of RAS. This would provide some evidence of 
“treatment creep” which is the tendency for the unnecessary provision of health care services 
motivated by generating revenue, sometimes to recuperate extensive costs in the investment of 
expensive medical technologies. Given that the hospitals have a similar, even overlapping, 
market of patients from which to draw, we expect the levels of RAS intensity to be similar unless 
indicative of “treatment creep”. We estimate a model as in (1) using the spatial autoregressive 
specification with a continuous dependent variable which represents the percentage of the 
hospital’s procedures that were RAS. The results at the intensive margin are provided in column 
4 of Table 5. Only private insurance has significance such that those hospitals with more private-
insurance-payer patients are more likely to make use of the surgical robot. The spatial parameter 
is not statistically significant indicating that the intensity of robot usage is independent of the 
intensity of use at neighboring hospitals with the technology.  
5.2.5. Traditional MAR 
As a point of reference, we have estimated the model to reflect the conventional testing of the 
medical arms race hypothesis. That is, we have constructed a hospital-specific HHI by finding 
for each hospital the ratio of its licensed beds to the number of licensed beds in its market, then 
squaring these shares. For each hospital market, we identify and sum the four largest squared 
shares of licensed beds. The computed HHI ranges from 72.12 to 10,000 with a mean of 1,555 
for the 196 hospitals for which this measure could be computed. Estimation was performed via 
MCMC probit with 10,000 iterations and a burn-in period of 1,000. Table 5, column 5 reports the 
results of this specification whose only difference from the SARP model is to replace the 
spatially-weighted average of nearest neighboring hospitals’ provision of RAS with a more 
general construct of market competition, the HHI.  
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First, we note that the HHI is statistically significant and positive but negligible. This 
suggests that in more concentrated markets (i.e. less competitive), a hospital may be slightly 
more likely to offer RAS. This result contrasts with the post-managed care literature from 
Melnick & Zwanziger (1988) that identifies a loss of correlation between market concentration 
and hospital costs. Compared to the specification in which we control directly for competition 
via the spatially-weighted neighboring hospital robot decisions, many of the other variables have 
statistical significance although there is consistency regarding the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients for all except the proportion of Medicare payers which is here positively associated 
with the provision of the technology. 
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6. Conclusion 
We conclude that a spatial strategic interaction among hospitals does exist and that the adoption 
of the surgical robot among hospitals in the state of Florida occurs not as a result of but in spite 
of the decision of competing hospital’s decision to offer robotic-assisted procedures. In 
particular, it is more likely for non-neighboring hospitals to adopt the robotic technology. This 
particular spatial pattern we observe can be explained by Reinganum's (1981) theory that 
competition acts to limit the diffusion of the surgical robot. These results are not sensitive to 
restricting competition to hospitals of similar (large) capacity which might be more likely to 
consider each other rivals. Networks of hospitals were considered as well without substantially 
affecting our main results. The study lends support to the theory that competition does not 
necessarily lead to the overprovision of medical technology, an important finding for all 
healthcare stakeholders.  
Compared to other studies on the adoption of the surgical robot that find less concentrated 
markets are associated with robot adoption (Wright et al. 2016; Barbash et al. 2014, Li et al. 
2014), our study relies on a spatial approach to address the underlying mechanism through which 
competition may affect the decision to adopt the technology and we find that the strategic 
interaction underlying competition actually serves to limit the adoption of the technology. We 
also find that, conditional on robot ownership, a hospital is no more likely to use the robot if 
facing more competition. These results corroborate with Wright et al. (2016). 
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Limitations of the current study include the inability to claim causal statements given the 
cross-sectional nature of the data. Because we cannot control for time-invariant, unobservable 
characteristics of the hospital such as management style (a key factor in technology adoption, as 
mentioned in section 2), we cannot conclusively determine that the neighboring hospital’s 
decision to offer robotic surgery caused a given hospital to not offer the surgical robot. We can 
say only that, in equilibrium, the decision is (negatively) related to the decision of neighboring 
hospitals or that a hospital is less likely to offer robotic surgery if neighboring hospitals do so, on 
average. The current approach also assumes that the strategic interaction determined by the 
analysis occurs between all pairs of hospitals whereas localized differences in strategic 
interaction are possible. Finally, it is worth noting that medical technology is subject to 
improvements and innovation. Furthermore, with regards to the cost side of welfare, throughout 
the period of this study, Intuitive is the monopolist in the surgical robot market. Some of the 
company’s initial patents have expired. As more suppliers enter the market, we can expect the 
costs of the surgical robot, disposables and maintenance contracts will decline. The purpose of 
this study was to investigate whether hospitals were making the decision to procure technology 
(i.e. surgical robots) as a result of competitive pressures. It therefore took advantage of the 
timespan during which clinical evidence in support of the adoption was lacking to provide 
insight onto competition behavior in the hospital market with respect to welfare-reducing effects 
of less concentrated hospital markets. 
In addition to the empirical findings which can shed light on the strategic interaction among 
hospitals with regard to medical technology adoption, this paper seeks to further the application 
of the spatial autoregressive model which can be useful for investigating social learning, learning 
from others and technological externalities (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 
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2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). More importantly, we wish to contribute to the limited 
application of discrete choice spatial models specifically.  
Further research relating to this topic may attempt to make more thorough consideration of 
the hospital networks which are growing, especially in response to structural changes in the 
healthcare market, and which pose a challenge for the current spatial methodologies. 
Additionally, in a future study we may be able to investigate whether hospitals respond to 
neighboring hospitals’ technology procurement decisions by offering a strategic substitute 
medical technology. This can be accomplished using the spatial Durbin regression model, an 
extension of the spatial autoregressive model in which the neighboring hospital characteristics 
are also a weighted independent variable. The applications of the spatial approach to the 
healthcare market are vast, as the impact of competition is a topic of continuous study, especially 
as the healthcare market faces structural changes in our attempt to improve the healthcare system 
in this country. 
  
   
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. References 
Bala, V., & Goyal, S. (1998). Learning from neighbors. Review of Economic Studies, 65(3), 1–
41. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00059 
Barbash, G. I., Friedman, B., Glied, S. a, & Steiner, C. a. (2014). Factors associated with 
adoption of robotic surgical technology in US hospitals and relationship to radical 
prostatectomy procedure volume. Annals of Surgery, 259(1), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/SLA.0b013e3182a5c8b8 
Barbash, G. I., & Glied, S. A. (2010). New Technology and Health Care Costs -- The Case of 
Robot-Assisted Surgery. The New England Journal of Medicine, 363(8), 701–704. 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1415160 
Barros, P. P., & Martinez-Giraltb, X. (2013). Health economics: An industrial organization 
perspective. Health Economics: An Industrial Organization Perspective. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203357422 
Barros, P. P., Pinto, C. G., & Machado,  a. (1999). A signalling theory of excessive technological 
adoption. Health Care Management Science, 2(2), 117–23. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10916608 
Brennan, G. D. G. (2006). Pediatric appendicitis: Pathophysiology and appropriate use of 
diagnostic imaging. Canadian Journal of Emergency Medicine. 
Case, A. (1992). Neighborhood influence and technological change. Regional Science and 
   
49 
 
Urban Economics, 22(3), 491–508. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-0462(92)90041-X 
Chandra, A., Holmes, J., & Skinner, J. (2013). Is This Time Different? The Slowdown in 
Healthcare Spending. NBER Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.3386/w19700 
Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Simon, C. (1992). Is hospital competition wasteful? The Rand 
Journal of Economics, 23(2), 247–262. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554863 
Franzese Jr, R., & Hays, J. (2009). Spatial Econometric Models of Interdependence: The Spatial 
Probit Model: Estimation, Interpretation, and Presentation. Www-Personal.umich.edu. 
Retrieved from http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Franzese.Essex.Specification.8-
9.S-EcomexModsInterdep.S-QualDep.pdf 
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1985). Pre-emption and rent equalisation in the adoption of new 
technology. Review of Economic Studies, 45(3), 296–319. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Gala, R. B., Margulies, R., Steinberg, A., Murphy, M., Lukban, J., Jeppson, P., … Sung, V. 
(2014). Systematic Review of Robotic Surgery in Gynecology: Robotic Techniques 
Compared With Laparoscopy and Laparotomy. Journal of Minimally Invasive Gynecology. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmig.2013.11.010 
Geweke, J. (1991). Efficient Simulation from the Multivariate Normal and Student-t 
Distributions Subject to Linear Constraints and the Evaluation of Constraint Probabilities. 
Computing Science and Statistics: The 23rd Symposium on the Interface, 571–578. 
https://doi.org/10.1.1.26.6892 
Gravelle, H., Santos, R., & Siciliani, L. (2014). Does a hospital â€TM s quality depend on the 
   
50 
 
quality of other hospitals ? A spatial econometrics approach. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 49, 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.09.005 
James H. Albert, S. C. (1993). Bayesian Analysis of Binary and Polychotomous Response Data. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88(422). Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2290350?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
Kessler, D., & McClellan, M. (1999). Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful? The Rand 
Journal of Economics, 23(May), 247–262. https://doi.org/10.3386/w7266 
Kostov, P. (2010). Model boosting for spatial weighting matrix selection in spatial lag models. 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 37(3), 533–549. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/b35137 
Ladapo, J. A., Horwitz, J. R., Weinstein, M. C., Gazelle, G. S., & Cutler, D. M. (2009). Adoption 
and spread of new imaging technology: A case study. Health Affairs, 28(6), w1122–w1132. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.28.6.w1122 
LeSage, J. P., Kelley Pace, R., Lam, N., Campanella, R., & Liu, X. (2011). New Orleans 
business recovery in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series A: Statistics in Society, 174(4), 1007–1027. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
985X.2011.00712.x 
LeSage, J. P., & Pace, R. K. (2014). The Biggest Myth in Spatial Econometrics. Econometrics, 
2(4), 217–249. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1725503 
LeSage, J., & Pace, R. K. (2009). Introduction to Spatial Econometrics. Statistics: a Series of 
Textbooks and Monographs. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-5823.2009.00095_9.x 
   
51 
 
Li, H., Calder, C. A., & Cressie, N. (2007). Beyond Moran’s I: Testing for spatial dependence 
based on the spatial autoregressive model. Geographical Analysis, 39(4), 357–375. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4632.2007.00708.x 
Li, H., Gail, M. H., Scott Braithwaite, R., Gold, H. T., Walter, D., Liu, M., … Makarov, D. V. 
(2014). Are hospitals “keeping up with the Joneses”?: Assessing the spatial and temporal 
diffusion of the surgical robot. Healthcare, 2(2), 152–157. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hjdsi.2013.10.002 
Luft, H. S., Robinson, J. C., Garnick, D. W., Maerki, S. C., & McPhee, S. J. (1986). The role of 
specialized clinical services in competition among hospitals. Inquiry : A Journal of Medical 
Care Organization, Provision and Financing, 23(1), 83–94. 
Melnick, G. A., & Zwanziger, J. (1988). Hospital behavior under competition and cost-
containment policies. The California experience, 1980 to 1985. JAMA, 260(18), 2669–2675. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1988.03410180077033 
Mobley, L. R. (2003). Estimating hospital market pricing: An equilibrium approach using spatial 
econometrics. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 33(4), 489–516. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-0462(02)00059-5 
Mobley, L. R., Frech, H. E., & Anselin, L. (2009). Spatial Interaction, Spatial Multipliers and 
Hospital Competition. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 16(1), 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13571510802638908 
Newhouse, J. P. (1992). Medical care costs: how much welfare loss? The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 6(3), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.3.3 
   
52 
 
Pace, Rk., & LeSage, J. (2010). Spatial Econometrics. Handbook of Spatial Statistics. 
https://doi.org/doi:10.1201/9781420072884-c15 
Reinganum, J. F. (1981). Market structure and the diffusion of new technology. The Bell Journal 
of Economics, 12(2), 618–624. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003576 
Robinson, J. C. (1988). Hospital quality competition and the economics of imperfect 
information. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 66(3), 465–81. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3211089 
Robinson, J. C., & Luft, H. S. (1985). The impact of hospital market structure on patient volume, 
average length of stay, and the cost of care. Journal of Health Economics, 4(4), 333–356. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(85)90012-8 
Schleifer, D., & Rothman, D. J. (2012). “The Ultimate Decision Is Yours”: Exploring Patients’ 
Attitudes about the Overuse of Medical Interventions. PLoS ONE, 7(12). 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0052552 
Skinner, J. S., Foundation, J., Balan, D., Chernew, M., Currie, J., Cutler, D., … Wennberg, J. 
(2011). Technology growth and expenditure growth in health care. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Bulletin on Aging and Health, (2), 1–2. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21957511 
Smith, S., Newhouse, J. P., & Freeland, M. S. (2009). Income, insurance, and technology: Why 
does health spending outpace economic growth? Health Affairs, 28(5), 1276–1284. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.1276 
Tewari, A., Sooriakumaran, P., Bloch, D. A., Seshadri-Kreaden, U., Hebert, A. E., & Wiklund, 
   
53 
 
P. (2012). Positive surgical margin and perioperative complication rates of primary surgical 
treatments for prostate cancer: A systematic review and meta-analysis comparing 
retropubic, laparoscopic, and robotic prostatectomy. European Urology. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eururo.2012.02.029 
Yaxley, J. W., Coughlin, G. D., Chambers, S. K., Occhipinti, S., Samaratunga, H., Zajdlewicz, 
L., … Gardiner, R. A. (2016). Robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy versus open 
radical retropubic prostatectomy: early outcomes from a randomised controlled phase 3 
study. The Lancet, 388(10049), 1057–1066. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)30592-
X 
Zwanziger, J., & Melnick, G. A. (1988). The effects of hospital competition and the Medicare 
PPS program on hospital cost behavior in California. Journal of Health Economics, 7(4), 
301–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(88)90018-5 
Wright JD, Tergas AI, Hou JY, et al. (2016). Effect of Regional Hospital Competition and  
Hospital Financial Status on the Use of Robotic-Assisted Surgery. JAMA Surg. Published 
online February 17, 2016. doi:10.1001/jamasurg.2015.5508. 
  
   
54 
 
Table 2. Descriptive characteristics 
Notes. The full sample consists of 196 long-term, acute-care hospitals in the state of Florida in 2013. 
  
Variable Mean SE Min Max
Medicare 0.565 0.174 0.001 0.857
Medicaid               0.156 0.137 0.000 0.683
private insurance       0.156 0.087 0.000 0.536
non-profit              0.357 0.482 0.000 1.000
market income  (log; $,000)       3.374 0.199 3.000 3.987
market male           49.497 1.527 48.293 56.084
market bachelor        11.153 1.888 5.633 13.406
market white             76.861 5.483 67.376 90.302
market 65+ 25.232 6.130 14.329 43.198
population density (per acre) 0.645 0.497 0.023 1.992
licensed beds             157.964 185.030 20.000 1493.000
rural 0.274 0.449 0.000 1.000
Variable Mean SE Min Max
Medicare 0.478 0.134 0.142 0.778
Medicaid               0.196 0.101 0.019 0.468
private insurance       0.208 0.080 0.085 0.462
non-profit              0.420 0.496 0.000 1.000
market income  (log; $,000)       3.394 0.171 3.005 3.942
market male           48.883 0.791 48.228 54.235
market bachelor        11.847 1.291 6.212 13.458
market white             75.446 5.496 62.251 87.170
market 65+ 25.157 5.313 16.030 40.503
population density (per acre) 0.871 0.483 0.104 2.097
licensed beds             356.732 216.899 62.000 1217.000
rural 0.027 0.162 0.000 1.000
Hospitals without surgical robot (n=84)
Hospitals with surgical robot (n=112)
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Table 3. Spatial and non-spatial probit estimation results 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 SARP  Probit 
Medicare -0.003  0.340*** 
 (2.84)  (0.04) 
Medicaid                0.717  1.208*** 
 (2.44)  (0.05) 
private insurance        3.691*  3.777*** 
 (2.11)  (0.04) 
non-profit               0.117  0.086*** 
 (0.23)  (0.00) 
market income (log; $,000)        1.270  1.255*** 
 (1.08)  (0.02) 
market male            -0.360  -0.317*** 
 (0.24)  (0.00) 
market bachelor         -0.089  -0.128*** 
 (0.13)  (0.00) 
market white              -0.027  -0.012*** 
 (0.04)  (0.00) 
market 65+ -0.021  -0.024*** 
 (0.04)  (0.00) 
population density (per acre) -0.342  -0.502*** 
 (0.46)  (0.01) 
licensed beds              0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
rural 1.315***  -1.167*** 
 (0.47)  (0.01) 
Wy -0.610**   
 (0.25)   
Observations 196  196 
Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates 
from the spatial autoregressive probit (SARP) model estimated using MCMC methods with diffuse priors. Reported 
estimates are the full conditional means based on 10,000 samples after 1,000-sample burn-in. Estimates in column 2 
are from the non-spatial probit model estimated using MCMC. Standard errors of the means are in parenthesis. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively.  
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Table 4. Marginal effects from the SARP estimation 
            
 (a) Direct effects  (b) Indirect effects  (c) Total effects 
 Lower Posterior mean Upper  Lower Posterior mean Upper  Lower Posterior mean Upper 
Medicare -1.010 0.001 1.016  -0.403 -0.001 0.396  -0.639 0.000 0.641 
Medicaid                -0.936 0.205 1.347  -0.536 -0.076 0.363  -0.590 0.129 0.860 
private insurance        0.069 1.044 2.010  -0.844 -0.383 0.005  0.044 0.662 1.316 
non-profit               -0.076 0.033 0.142  -0.057 -0.012 0.029  -0.047 0.021 0.092 
market income  (log; $,000)        -0.142 0.359 0.854  -0.363 -0.132 0.053  -0.088 0.226 0.548 
market male            -0.214 -0.102 0.008  -0.004 0.038 0.091  -0.138 -0.064 0.004 
market bachelor         -0.087 -0.025 0.039  -0.015 0.009 0.035  -0.056 -0.016 0.024 
market white              -0.026 -0.008 0.011  -0.004 0.003 0.011  -0.016 -0.005 0.007 
market 65+ -0.023 -0.006 0.012  -0.005 0.002 0.009  -0.015 -0.004 0.007 
population density (per acre) -0.309 -0.096 0.121  -0.048 0.034 0.125  -0.199 -0.062 0.075 
licensed beds              0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001 
rural -0.581 -0.372 -0.165  0.029 0.138 0.256  -0.382 -0.234 -0.102 
Notes. Upper and lower refer to the 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 5. Earlier time-period 
 (1)  (2) 
 
SARP 
2013  
SARP 
2011 
Medicare -0.003  1.939 
 (2.84)  (2.21) 
Medicaid                0.717  3.036 
 (2.44)  (2.57) 
private insurance        3.691*  6.730*** 
 (2.11)  (2.18) 
non-profit               0.117  -0.043 
 (0.23)  (0.24) 
market income  (log; $,000)        1.270  -0.372 
 (1.08)  (1.19) 
market male            -0.360  -0.099 
 (0.24)  (0.23) 
market bachelor         -0.089  0.077 
 (0.13)  (0.14) 
market white              -0.027  -0.003 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
market 65+ -0.021  0.018 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
population density (per acre) -0.342  -0.257 
 (0.46)  (0.45) 
licensed beds              0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
rural 1.315***  -1.084** 
 (0.47)  (0.52) 
Wy -0.610**  -0.619** 
 (0.25)  (0.25) 
Observations 196  196 
Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates 
from the spatial autoregressive probit (SARP) model estimated using MCMC methods with diffuse priors for 2013 and 
column 2 contains same for 2011. Reported estimates are the full conditional means based on 10,000 samples after 
1,000-sample burn-in. Standard errors of the means are in parenthesis. Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Table 6. Other robustness checks 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 SARP 2013  SARP - Large  SARP Network  LPM - Intensive  HHI  
Medicare -0.003  -0.738  0.154  0.010  0.372*** 
 (2.84)  (2.72)  (2.17)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
Medicaid                0.717  -0.227  0.875  -0.008  1.264*** 
 (2.44)  (3.07)  (2.44)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
private insurance        3.691*  5.322*  4.024*  0.044**  3.806*** 
 (2.11)  (2.82)  (2.13)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
non-profit               0.117  0.094  0.148  -0.001  0.091*** 
 (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
market income  (log; $,000)        1.270  2.337*  1.358  0.007  1.275*** 
 (1.08)  (1.20)  (1.08)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
market male            -0.360  -0.243  -0.360  -0.002  -0.351*** 
 (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
market bachelor         -0.089  -0.352**  -0.093  -0.001  -0.141*** 
 (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
market white              -0.027  -0.047  -0.024  0.000  -0.012*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
market 65+ -0.021  -0.032  -0.024  0.000  -0.024 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
population density (per acre) -0.342  -0.403  -0.311  0.000  -0.458*** 
 (0.46)  (0.52)  (0.47)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
licensed beds              0.002***  0.002**  0.002***  0.000  0.002*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
rural -1.315***  -0.715  -1.303***  -0.002  -1.218*** 
 (0.47)  (0.73)  (0.47)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
network     -0.179     
 
    (0.23)     
HHI         0.000*** 
 
        (0.00) 
Wy -0.610**  -0.651***  -0.612**  0.111   
 (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.23)   
Observations 196  164  196  112  196 
Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates from the spatial 
autoregressive probit (SARP) model for comparison. Estimates in column 2 correspond to the analysis excluding smaller hospitals. 
Column 3 adds a network dummy variable to the specification. The intensive margin is assessed for the hospitals with the surgical robot 
in column 4. Column 5 represents the HHI-based approach to competition on the technology adoption. Standard errors of the means 
are in parenthesis. Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Appendix A. Variables 
Summary of variables, their calculation and the rationale for inclusion follows. Note that all 
market variables have been created by first establishing a hospital’s market using DriveTime 
analysis in ArcGIS 10.3, which superimposes a polygon on the Census Block Groups (CBG) 
corresponding to 60-minute drive times using all current available, accessible roadways. Using 
the rule that the CBG will be included in the market if the polygon contains the population-
weighted centroid of the CBG, we aggregate the variables of interest and calculate proportions. 
These hospital-specific market boundaries allow for both variation in market characteristics and 
overlapping of potential patients which underlies competition. 
Table 7 
Table A.1. Table of variables 
 Variable Description Rationale for Inclusion 
 Dependent   
 robot a binary variable for whether 
hospital i offers service m 
where m= {open robotic 
assisted procedures, 
laparoscopic robotic assisted 
procedures, percutaneous 
robotic assisted procedures, 
endoscopic robotic assisted 
procedures, thoracoscopic 
robotic assisted procedures, 
other and unspecified robotic 
assisted procedures} 
inconclusive evidence on the 
health outcomes of robotic-
assisted surgery when 
compared to traditional 
methods, coupled with the 
expenses suggests robotic-
assisted surgical procedures 
are a component of the 
“medical arms” in the arms 
race 
 Independent   
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 spatial_lag spatially-weighted linear 
combination of the decision 
of neighboring hospitals to 
provide robotic surgery 
hospitals may interact 
strategically in a 
complementary way, 
providing specialized 
services that are unique to 
the market, or in a substitute 
manner, offering the same 
specialized services as 
neighboring hospitals; or 
strategic interaction may not 
exist at all 
principle payer 
(‘compositional 
variable’; 
omitted 
category is 
‘other’) 
medicare percent of patients with 
Medicare insurance 
insurance coverage and 
reimbursement rates may 
impact a hospital’s decision 
to provide robot-assisted 
procedures 
medicaid percent of patients with 
Medicaid insurance 
private percent of patients with 
private insurance 
 non_profit a binary variable for whether 
hospital i is non-profit 
(omitted category includes: 
investor owned, Federal, 
public/government, State) 
 
 lmrkt_inc hospital market median 
income 
case-mix control; hospitals in 
wealthier markets may be 
incentivized to advertise 
and/or provide specialized 
services; alternatively, since 
correlated with bachelor, 
may reduce the need for 
certain specialized services 
given a reduced likelihood of 
disease 
 mrkt_male percentage of the GIS-
defined hospital market 
population total that are male 
case-mix control; certain 
diseases and therefore 
treatments vary by gender 
 mrkt_bach percentage of the GIS-
defined hospital market 
population total with a 
Bachelor degree 
case-mix control; certain 
diseases and therefore 
treatments vary by education 
 mrkt_white percentage of the GIS-
defined hospital market 
population total that are 
white 
case-mix control; certain 
diseases and therefore 
treatments vary by race 
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 mrkt_65 percentage of the GIS-
defined hospital market 
population total that are 65+ 
years in age 
case-mix control; certain 
diseases and therefore 
treatments vary by age 
 pop_dens hospital market population; 
market summed population 
over market summed acres 
case-mix control; hospitals in 
larger markets may be 
themselves larger hospitals, 
offering more services 
 licensed beds number of licensed beds in 
hospital 
proxy for hospital size; larger 
hospitals may have more 
scope 
 rural binary variable indicating 
whether hospital is located in 
rural area  
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Below are the full histograms for the independent variables. 
Table 8 
Table A.2. Histograms of independent variables 
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Appendix B. Spatial weights and exploratory spatial analysis 
B.1. Spatial weights matrix 
The spatial weighting matrix is the positive 𝑁×𝑁 matrix 𝑾 where each element is a spatial 
weight, 𝑤𝑖𝑗: 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, that summarizes the spatial relations between the 𝑛 units in space. The 
diagonal elements are conventionally set to 0 to indicate one is not a neighbor to itself, that is, 
𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. The off-diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, can be defined a number of 
different ways depending on the particular situation being modeled.  For example, 𝑤𝑖𝑗= 1 if 
distance between i and j is ≤ 𝑘; alternatively, 𝑤𝑖𝑗= 1 for m nearest neighbors; or another option 
is 𝑤𝑖𝑗= 1 if i and j are contiguous.  Estimating the spatial weights matrix elements precludes 
identification, so some assumption on the particular nature of the spatial relationship is required. 
We have defined 𝑾 to be row-normalized, inverse-distance with each element, 𝑤𝑖𝑗, expressing 
the degree of spatial proximity as:  
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1
𝑗
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠
0    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is defined as the distance between hospital i and j and the n diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑖, 
take the value of zero Thus, 𝑾𝒚  is the spatial-weighted average of the neighbor outcomes.  
A simple example will illustrate the above. The following table summarizes the relationship 
between three units in space. In parentheses are the distances between units. 
Unit Neighbors (distance) 
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1 2 (2), 3(1) 
2 1 (2), 3(3) 
3 1 (1), 2(3) 
This information can be summarized in an inverse-distance matrix wherein each element, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1, 
represents the inverse of the distance between units i and j. For instance, 𝐷 =
(
 
0 1 2⁄ 1
1
2⁄ 0
1
3⁄
1 1 3⁄ 0 )
   
We can then divide each element in the row by the sum of the row-elements to define the new 
elements of the row-normalized 𝑾 , ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1, = 1 , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛𝑛𝑗=1  
𝑾 =
(
 
0 1 3⁄
2
3⁄
3
5⁄ 0
2
5⁄
3
4⁄
1
4⁄ 0 )
   
If 𝒚 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3)
′ then 𝑾𝒚 =
(
 
1
3⁄ 𝑦2 +
2
3⁄ 𝑦3
3
5⁄ 𝑦1 +
2
5⁄ 𝑦3
3
4⁄ 𝑦1 +
1
4⁄ 𝑦2)
 , a spatial-weighted average of neighboring 
response variables.  
B.2. Moran’s I 
It is possible to measure the positive, negative, or nonexistent degree to which observations with 
location have similar attributes, that is, spatial autocorrelation. We first estimate a non-spatial 
regression and save the residuals. Then, a global spatial autocorrelation can be tested for using 
the Moran’s I statistic which takes the form 𝐼 =  
𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗 (𝑋𝑖−?̅?)(𝑋𝑗−?̅?)𝑖
∑ (𝑋𝑖−?̅?)
2
𝑖
 . Moran’s I is 
asymptotically normal under the null hypothesis that no spatial autocorrelation exists, so for our 
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sample we can interpret the test statistic 
𝐼−𝐸[𝐼]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)
 as a p-value. Given the results below, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that no global spatial autocorrelation exists. In other words, 
the data appear to exhibit overall complete spatial randomness. However, the Moran’s I statistic 
is limited by being a global statistical measurement which means it is best for identifying a 
certain relationship pattern that exists across the whole study area and is incapable of identifying 
particular spatial clustering (Hongfei Li, Calder, & Cressie, 2007). Note that these results are a 
function of the form of 𝑾 which means improperly specified weights may lead to a type II error. 
This statistic’s limitations are not well established. For example, it has been shown that Moran’s 
I is only an accurate measure of the spatial dependence if the spatial parameter is near zero. 
 
Table 9 
Table B.1. Moran's I test statistic 
Moran I statistic standard deviate = -0.2606, p-value = 0.7944 
alternative hypothesis: two.sided    
sample estimates:      
Observed Moran I      Expectation         Variance   
-0.0329   -0.0263  0.0006   
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Appendix C. Bayesian analysis 
C.1. Derivation of the Bayesian SAR full conditionals 
We include the derivation of the full conditional distributions from the spatial autoregressive 
model with a continuous outcome as estimated in the intensive margin analysis. 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀,   where 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝐼𝑛) 
Note: 
 𝑦 − 𝜌𝑊𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀  
𝑦(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀  
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1(𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀) 
𝜀 =  𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽 
Where 𝐴 = 𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊 
Likelihood: 𝐿(𝑦, 𝑋,𝑊|𝛽, 𝜎2, 𝜌) = (2𝜋)−
𝑛
2(𝜎2)−
𝑛
2|𝐴|exp {−0.5𝜎−2(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)} 
 
Prior distributions: 
(𝛽, 𝜎2)~𝑁𝐼𝐺(𝑐, 𝑇, 𝑎, 𝑏) 
𝜋(𝛽, 𝜎2) = 𝜋(𝛽|𝜎2)𝜋(𝜎2) = 𝑁(𝑐, 𝜎2𝑇)𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏) 
= (2𝜋)−
𝑘
2(𝜎2)−
𝑘
2|𝑇|−
1
2exp {−0.5𝜎−2(𝛽 − 𝑐)′𝑇−1(𝛽 − 𝑐)}×
𝑏𝑎
Γ(𝑎)
(𝜎2)−(𝑎+1)𝑒𝑥𝑝{−0.5𝜎−22𝑏} 
Full posterior: 
𝑝(𝛽, 𝜎2, 𝜌|𝑦, 𝑋,𝑊)
∝  (𝜎2)−(
𝑛
2+
𝑘
2+𝑎+1)|𝐴|exp{−0.5(𝜎2)−1[(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)
+ (𝛽 − 𝑐)′𝑇−1
 
(𝛽 − 𝑐) + 2𝑏]} 
Expanding the terms within squared brackets, 
𝑦′𝐴′𝐴𝑦 − 𝑦′𝐴′𝑋𝛽 − 𝛽′𝑋′𝐴𝑦 + 𝛽′𝑋′𝑋𝛽 + 𝛽′𝑇−1𝛽 − 𝛽′𝑇−1𝑐 − 𝑐′𝑇−1𝛽 + 𝑐′𝑇−1𝑐 + 2𝑏 
= 𝛽′(𝑋′𝑋 + 𝑇−1)𝛽 − 𝛽′(𝑋′𝐴𝑦 + 𝑇−1𝑐) − (𝑦′𝐴′𝑋 + 𝑐′𝑇−1)𝛽 + 𝑐′𝑇−1𝑐 + 2𝑏 + 𝑦′𝐴′𝐴𝑦 
If we let 
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𝑐∗ = (𝑋′𝑋 + 𝑇−1)(𝑋′𝐴𝑦 + 𝑇−1𝑐) 
𝑇∗ = (𝑋′𝑋 + 𝑇−1)−1 
𝑏∗ = 𝑏 + 0.5(𝑐′𝑇−1𝑐 + 𝑦′𝐴′𝐴𝑦 + 𝑦′𝐴′𝑋 + 𝑐′𝑇−1) 
𝑎∗ =
𝑛
2
+ 𝑎 
Then,   
(𝛽, 𝜎2, 𝜌|𝑦, 𝑋,𝑊) ∝ (𝜎2)−(𝑎
∗ +
𝑘
2+1)|𝐴|exp{−0.5(𝜎2)−1[(𝛽 − 𝑐∗)′(𝑇∗)−1
 
(𝛽 − 𝑐∗) + 2𝑏∗]} 
 
This posterior distribution is close to but not exactly a tractable form (i.e. the NIG prior is not a 
conjugate). 
If 𝜌 = 0 then 𝐴 = 𝐼𝑛 and, indeed,  𝛽, 𝜎
2|𝑦, 𝑋,𝑊~𝑁𝐼𝐺[𝑐∗, 𝑇∗−1, 𝑎∗, 𝑏∗]  
 
An uninformative prior, 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0; 𝑇−1 = 0 allows us to simplify the posterior  
∝ (𝜎2)−
𝑛
2|𝐴|exp {−0.5𝜎−2(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)}𝑝(𝜌) 
 
C.2. Convergence diagnostics for simulation-based Bayesian inference  
 
Useful for determining convergence, the figure below displays the trace plot of the spatial 
parameter from the MCMC. The plot mixes across most of the distribution and centers/becomes 
stationary on -0.5 (i.e. the mean and variance are relatively constant), indicating it likely 
approximates the right posterior distribution of rho with the user-set burn-in period of 1000. The 
convergence diagnostics and posterior distributions for all parameters follow, each displaying 
proper convergence behavior.  
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Figure 6. Trace plot and posterior distribution for the spatial parameter, rho 
Figure 6. Trace plot and posterior distribution for the spatial parameter, rho 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next 
Page) 
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C.3. Selection of number of neighbors; AIC model comparison 
In addition to specifying the elements of the spatial weights matrix, 𝑾, to be of inverse-distance 
which assigns a greater weight to hospitals that are nearer in proximity, we also assume there is a 
limit to the number of hospitals a given hospital may consider a rival. Beyond this threshold, the 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 will take the value of zero. This is a reasonable assumption since the hospital sample spans 
the entire state of Florida. Note that LeSage & Pace (2014) claim that a well-specified and 
properly interpreted spatial regression model is not sensitive to the assumed structure of the 
spatial relationship captured in 𝑾. Nonetheless, to attempt to reveal the optimal number of rival 
hospitals for the spatial weights matrix, we estimate the model with several specifications of 𝑾 
using the k nearest neighbors. To determine the “stopping point”, we then use the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) which evaluates the fit of the specification while penalizing for 
overfitting to minimize loss of information. In this form of model comparison, the lower AIC 
reflects the optimal model. This criterion is similar to one utilized by Kostov (2010) in attempt to 
find the “optimal” weighting matrix. Results for several of the specifications are reported in 
Table C.1. There are minimal differences in the measure of AIC (as well as the posterior means 
estimates); for each value of k tested; however, we take the results to indicate the optimal 
number of neighbors for the leading model to be k=10. Note that the optimal k will vary 
depending on the specification and we adjust accordingly. These results provide some empirical 
robustness to the conclusion of LeSage and Pace (2014) about the lack of sensitivity in the 
estimates to assumptions in 𝑾. Moreover, as explained by LeSage and Pace (2014), differences 
in estimates found while testing variations of the weighting matrix are likely the result of 
improper specification of the regression model which lends support to the specification described 
in Section 4. 
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Table 10 
Table C.1. Selection of the k nearest neighbors; AIC comparison 
                          
 SARP(k=8)  SARP (k=9)  SARP (k=10)  SARP (k=11)  
  Mean Pr(>|z|)   Mean Pr(>|z|)   Mean Pr(>|z|)   Mean Pr(>|z|)   
             
(Intercept) 18.885 0.119  17.026 0.149  16.361 0.166  15.007 0.181  
Medicare 0.167 0.940  0.073 0.974  0.096 0.965  0.168 0.939  
Medicaid 0.964 0.697  0.844 0.733  0.878 0.722  0.976 0.692  
Private insurance 4.010 0.065 . 3.719 0.084 . 3.802 0.073 . 3.691 0.086 . 
Non-profit 0.109 0.642  0.104 0.658  0.103 0.659  0.105 0.647  
Log(med. income) 1.381 0.216  1.366 0.201  1.305 0.234  1.179 0.273  
Market male -0.418 0.092 . -0.380 0.116  -0.365 0.133  -0.334 0.147  
Market Bachelor's -0.100 0.471  -0.091 0.511  -0.091 0.505  -0.097 0.469  
Market white -0.027 0.512  -0.027 0.511  -0.026 0.514  -0.023 0.548  
Market 65+ -0.023 0.552  -0.023 0.553  -0.021 0.579  -0.020 0.589  
Population density -0.356 0.458  -0.362 0.438  -0.332 0.483  -0.290 0.518  
Licensed beds 0.002 0.001 *** 0.002 0.001 *** 0.002 0.001 *** 0.002 0.001 *** 
Rural -1.297 0.007 ** -1.314 0.005 ** -1.317 0.005 ** -1.250 0.006 ** 
Wy (rho parameter) -0.665 0.003 ** -0.599 0.017 * -0.609 0.016 * -0.560 0.047 * 
  
           
AIC 231.318   231.641   231.220   232.493   
                          
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1         
 
 
